Charles Griffin’s two worst moments on the battle field came near Manassas, Virginia although under entirely distinct circumstances. Although Griffin’s role in the Union collapse on Henry Hill at First Bull Run was subject to Congressional questioning, Griffin’s career was not impacted and would ascend quickly during the Peninsula campaign. On the U.S. Army’s return to Bull Run, however, in late August 1862, Griffin found even greater controversy that threatened to derail his career and contributed to the ruin of his commander Fitz-John Porter.
After Griffin’s first triumph as a brigade commander when holding the Union’s far left at Malvern Hillon July 1, 1862, his battered Fifth Corps retreated along with the rest of the Army of the Potomac on the Peninsula to the defensive position near Harrison City. Griffin’s 2nd Brigade, of the 1st Division of the Fifth Corps, had suffered the most dead and wounded among all Army of the Potomac brigades during the Seven Days battles. The weakened brigade was bolstered by the addition of the 14th New York infantry regiment giving him five regiments, with 1,717 men reporting for duty (as of Sept. 1, 1862) [OR Vol XII, Part 3 p. 795].
According to Powell’s history of the Fifth Corps, Porter received orders to move the Fifth Corps to Newport News where the corps embarked on transports on August 20, arriving at Acquia Creek and immediately moving by rail to Fredericksburg where the corps arrived on August 23. (Powell, p. 193).
The Fifth Corps marched up the north bank of the Rappahannock River, arriving at Bealton Station on August 27th where Porter received orders from Gen. John Pope to proceed to Warrenton as rapidly as possible. Griffin estimated that his brigade marched 18 or 19 miles on the Aug 277th and the men were very fatigued, with many straggling. This relentless travel for nearly two weeks, took a toll on the soldiers who lacked water and were reduced to half rations for several days (Powell p. 196; OR XIX p 982).
The V Corps was ordered by the army commander John Pope to proceed to Bristoe Station, where they arrived on the morning of August 28 and taking “position on the north side of Broad Run” and remained there. (Powell p. 198).
Early on the morning of August 29, Pope ordered Porter to Centreville, and the corps marched from Bristoe to Manassas Junction. At Manassas, new orders were received directing the corps to Gainesville. With Morell’s division in the lead, and Griffin at the head of the column, the corps headed up the Gainesville-Manassas Junction road. (Jermann p. 95).
After marching a couple of miles toward Gainesville, Griffin received a report from a Union cavalryman of a small number of Confederate “mounted men” in the vicinity. Griffin stopped his brigade and sent four companies of the 62nd Penn ahead as skirmishers and flankers. The brigade then resumed their march until coming to Dawkins Branch where the 62nd Penn skirmishers exchanged fire with Confederate pickets (Jermann p. 95). Porter arrived, ordering a halt to the march, and Griffin sent forward the rest of the 62ndPenn to support the skirmish line. At some point, Griffin’s brigade took “three mounted prisoners.” [OR p. 986] Gen. McDowell arrived and spoke with Porter, Griffin was ordered to proceed “to the right” with the aim of connecting with other Union units. Griffin’s brigade crossed the railroad but shortly “ran into ravines too steep for the artillery he needed to take with him” [Marvel p. 354] or “thick pine bushes” in Griffin’s words. Griffin was returning to a Union artillery position when enemy batteries opened fire and his brigade moved to the rear of the Union batteries and prepared to repel an attack. Around sundown, after Morell’s division started moving back down the road to Manassas Junction, they received an order to attack the enemy. Griffin turned his brigade around and marched a couple of miles in the direction of Gainesville. Morell delcared that it was too late to attack. Porter deferred to Morell direction to stop for the night – a decision that would have dire ramifications for Porter’s career.
Before daylight on August 30, Morell received an order from Porter to withdraw in the direction of Manassas. Morell’s division moved out, this time with Griffin’s brigade last “to bring up the rear and cover the retreat.” (Jermann p. 116). By the time Griffin brought in his skirmishers and moved out, he had lost sight of the rest of the division. Morell and then a staff member rode ahead to try to locate the column. Unknown to Morell and Griffin, however, the other brigades had turned up Sudley Springs Road toward the battlefield. Morell believed that Porter’s intended destination was Centreville. Accordingly, Griffin passed the Sudley Springs Road turnoff, ignoring the direction of “a man without a hat and coating” who pointed up Sudley Springs Rd, and proceeded instead along the Manassas Junction road to Centreville, inadvertently taking his brigade out of the battle. According to Capt. Augustus Marin of Batt C MA Light Artillery, Griffin’s men arrived at Centreville around noon and “went into camp.” [OR Vol XII, Pt 2, p. 466]
Morelll testified that he arrived at Centreville and discovered he had taken the wrong direction. He had expected to find Pope and Porter at Centreville but heard that Pope went to the front and that Porter was probably with him. Morell said he sent a note to Porter stating that he was at Centreville “and that as soon as Griffin’s brigade had got rations they would move on to the front. Griffin’s commissary immediately went to work to get rations for the men. Morell stated that he heard the firing of artillery in the distance, the first he had heard during the day and told Griffin that “I heard firing, and that we must move immediately.” [OR Vol XII Part 2, Sup. p. 971] Griffin “spoke of his men being out of rations, which, he said, were being issued then, and that they were very much fatigued.” Morell replied that he would go without waiting for Griffin, and that Griffin must “follow as soon as possible, and do the best he could.” Griffin’s brigade departed Centreville around 5pm but found the road blocked with stragglers coming from the battle toward Centreville, advanced about two miles, and found the bridge at Cub Run broken. Griffin’s brigade stood alone in the V Corps in suffering no casualties during Second Bull Run.
Jermann explains that neither Griffin nor General Sturgis (who made the same route error) were ever told where they were supposed to go other than to follow Sykes’ division, which had long moved ahead out of sight, and which they believed was headed to Centreville. Porter had not posted a competent staff officer at the Sudley Springs Road turn off to show the correct route. (Jermann p. 119)
John Pope’s Campaign Against Charles Griffin
One veteran from Griffin’s division later wrote that it appeared to his men that General Griffin led a charmed life, as he repeatedly exposed himself to enemy fire on the battlefield without suffereing a scratch. Griffin’s immunity from injury extended to army politics too when John Pope sought revenge for what Pope believed to be Griffin’s outright insubordination on August 30th.
Pope was outraged by Griffin’s conduct and testified that he believed that Griffin had remained at Centreville “in sight of the battle-field” without then coming to the field, implying that Griffin was deliberately insubordinate in refusing to engage his brigade in the battle. Pope testified that initially he informed Porter that while he was not about to report Porter to Washington, Pope “felt bound to do so in the case of Griffin.” [OR Vo. XII Part 2 Supplement p. 837-8].
Shortly after the battle, Pope had written to Halleck that Griffin “had manufactured an excuse to keep his brigade out of the fight on August 30,” Citing “reports of open criticism from the habitually gruff Griffin, Pope lodged a complaint of ‘constant talk’ against him from those two generals [Porter and Griffin], ‘indulged in publicly and in promiscuous company.’” [Marvel, p. 386 -7]
Gideon Welles recorded in his diary that Pope met with him and Lincoln on Sept. 4, 1862 and presented a draft report on the recent battle. Welles observed that the report, in its draft form, would cause “war among the generals, who are now more ready to fight each other than the enemy.” When leaving the meeting, Pope told Welles that “all his misfortunes are owing to the persistent determination of McClellan, Franklin, and Porter, aided by Ricketts, Griffin, and some others who were predetermined he should not be successful. They preferred he said, that the country should be ruined rather than he should triumph.” Welles Diary.
According to historian William Marvel, Lincoln sought to mollify Pope and “ordered a court of inquiry to investigate Porter’s conduct on August 29, as well as Griffin’s departure from the battlefield on August 30” via a special order dated Sept. 5. “Stanton relieved Porter, Franklin and Griffin from duty ‘until the charges against them can be investigated by a court of inquiry.’ The court met the next day, but because Mansfield was absent, it promptly adjourned.” Griffin was back on duty in a few days. [Marvel pp. 397-8]
Pope presented his allegations against Griffin in his after battle report. Pope wrote that one of Porter’s brigades “under General Griffin, got around to Centreville and remained there during the whole of the next day’s battle without coming on the field, though in full view of it, while General Griffin himself spent the day in making ill-natured strictures upon the general commanding (see paper marked D) the action in the presence of a promiscuous assemblage.” This “paper marked D” consisted of the following account from Col. Speed Butler written on Sept. 3, 1862: “Was ordered to Centreville by MG Pope on Saturday August 30. General Griffin arrived there with his command at 11 o’clock , coming from the direction of Manassas Junction. He moved his brigade to the north of the town, halted it, and came to General Pope’s headquarters, where he remained one hour, conversing with Lieutenant-Colonel Myers and myself. During this conversation Lt Col Myers asked him several times why his (General Griffin’s) brigade was not in the fight. General Griffin replied, ‘Never mind; I do not care.” He said that he was tired of being commanded by staff officers, and asked what Pope had ever done that he should be made a major-general. Also spoke disrespectfully and sneeringly of other superior officers; said that he heard that morning that General McClellan was to take command; hope that it was true. He then rode toward his command, and about two hours after sent an officer to ask whether he could get shoes for his men.” [OR Vol XII, Part 2, p. 15 , No. 1 Rep of MG John Pope, US Army of operations of Army of VA 6/26-9/2/62; p. 18 (Inclosure D].
Pope continued later in his report to contrast Griffin’s conduct with Sturgis and Piatt each of whom, though similarly straying from correct route, redirected their commands “as soon as it was discovered that Griffin did not intend to go forward to the field of battle, and reported to me late in the afternoon of that day. … [Sturgis and Piatt] deserve especial mention for the soldierly feeling which induced them, after being thus misled and with the bad example of Griffin before their eyes, to push forward with such zeal and alacrity to the field of battle…” [OR Vol. XII, Part 2, pp. 48-49]
At his own court martial, Porter defended Griffin (and Morell) stating that it was “wholly prudent and proper for General Morell’s division, in moving away under these orders from the immediate front of the enemy in force, to use careful precautions to prevent or repel the assault of that enemy upon our rear. General Griffin’s brigade was detailed for that special duty, and I say he is to be commended for his attention to the execution of that important duty, although it resulted in his accidental failure, by reason of missing his road without my knowledge, to make his way direct to the battle-field in pursuance of my order.“ [OR XII Part 2, sup. P. 1100]
More fallout:
Pope continued to complain to Halleck about Griffin (and Porter and McClellan) Halleck wrote to Pope on October, 10, 1862: “Again, you complain that Porter and Griffin have not been tried on your charges against them. You know that a court was ordered for their trial and that it was suspended because all officers were required in the field. A new court has been ordered, and they are to be tried, and the grounds of your charged to be fully investigated.” Pope, who had already been dispatched to Minnesota replied to Halleck on Oct. 20, 1862: “Why are McClellan, Porter, and Griffin retained in high commands with such charges of treachery and baseness hanging over them? Do you not believe these charges are true? Are they not substantiated to your satisfaction by the papers attached to the report containing them?…. You assume that I confine my charges to Porter and Griffin. My report tells another story. The greatest criminal is McClellan, and my charge is direct and plain against him.” [OR XII, Part 3, pp. 820-1]
On Oct. 17, 1862, McClellan complained to Halleck that Butterfield and Griffin were absent attending a court of inquiry in Washington and, along with Porter leaving for DC, their corps “will suffer from the absence of so many general officers.” [OR XIX, part 2, p. 439] Griffin testified before the Porter Court Martial proceedings on Dec. 29, 1862.
Summary:
Griffin’s conduct during the Second Bull Run campaign and leadership of his brigade seems entirely prudent and professional until the afternoon of Aug. 30th. His operations continuously reflected reasonable caution: in throwing out skirmishers on Aug 28th when he led the corps on the march, as well as the careful withdrawal on the morning of Aug. 29th when he held the corps’ rear, although this deliberateness caused him to lose sight of the brigades he was supposed to follow. He had nothing to do with the Morell’s refusal to attack on the evening of August 28th which decision Morell reached, in any event, because of darkness and not out of some attempt to undermine Pope at Porter’s direction. Nor was Griffin responsible for the failure on Aug. 29th to take the Sudley Springs Road turnoff which Porter had neglected to mark clearly for his command, and, in any event, Griffin was subordinate to Morell on this march and Morell guided Griffin’s brigade and other troops onto Centreville.
The one area in which it seems that Griffin may have blundered is in his apparently casual handling of his troops once they arrived at Centreville around noon on Aug. 29th when Morell discovered his mistake. It seems surprising that Griffin took four hours or more, to get his brigade moving again in the direction of the battle. Maybe it’s to Griffin’s credit that he prioritized caring for his exhausted and hungry men from a brigade which had recently suffered enormous casualties over Morell’s command to head west toward the fighting. Pope, however, considered Griffin’s conduct, as reported to him by Butler, as deliberate insubordination. I have no idea how long it would take an exhausted brigade of about 1,800 men who had gone “into camp” and received rations to form up again and march toward battle. Sturgis and Piatt with their regiments apparently managed this feat in much less time. Nor is there any way to explain Speed Butler’s report which makes Griffin sound flippant and bordering on willful misconduct. While there is no reason to infer that Griffin sought to sabotage Pope by withholding his brigade from battle, Griffin’s deliberateness of action over the previous few days certainly came close to the line of negligent performance of duty when he allowed his brigade to rest and eat on the afternoon of August 29th. Like his previous controversy at First Bull Run, Griffin’s performance at Second Bull Run also ended before a committee on inquiry. On both occasions, however, Griffin’s career did not appear to suffer any consequences and the matter was put behind him. For his commander, Fitz John Porter, however, the results were catastrophic.
Sources:
Donald R. Jermannn, Fitz-John Porter, Scapegoat of Second Manassas, The Rise, Fall and Rise of the General Accused of Disobedience (McFarland, 2009).
John Hennessy, Return to Bull Run,
William Marvel, Radical Sacrifice: the Rise and Ruin of Fitz John Porter, UNC Press
Gideon Welles Diary: https://archive.org/stream/diaryofgideonwel00well/diaryofgideonwel00well_djvu.txt
The War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Official Records)
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