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CASE OF FITZ JOHN PORTER.
DECEMBER 29, 1862
Brigadier General CHARLES GRIFFIN called by the Accused, and Sworn and examined as follows:
By the ACCUSED:
Question. Will you state your rank and position in the military service in August last?—Answer. Brigadier general of volunteers and captain in the 5th United States artillery.
Q. In whose army corps?—A. I belonged to the fifth army corps, then commanded by Major General Fitz John Porter; in General Morell’s division.
Q. About what time on the 27th of August did you arrive in Warrenton Junction with your brigade?—A. About Sundown.
Q. How far did you march that day?—A. We had marched from Barnett's ford, on the Rappahannock. We left there about 7 o'clock on the morning of the 27th of August. We estimated the distance to be from eighteen to nineteen miles. –
Q. What was the condition of the troops under your command on the evening of the 27th, with respect to fatigue?—A. They were very much broken down. I mean by that that they were very weary. We had a great many stragglers that day.
Q. Do you remember whether the day of the 27th of August was hot and dusty ?—A. It was a very warm day. I do not recollect as to the dust.
Q. State what was the character of the night between the 27th and the 28th of August.—A. The night of the 27th and the morning of the 28th was very dark. It rained a little about 10 o'clock that night, I should think; very little, just sprinkled.
Q. What was the condition of the road between Warrenton Junction and Bristow Station during that night and in the morning?—A. I did not know the condition of the road that night, nor did I know in the morning; that is, the entire road. The question is not definite.
Q. I mean with reference to the obstructions which you met, if any?— A. I received an order about 12 o'clock on the night of the 27th 161 of August, to move my brigade at 3 o'clock in the morning. At 3 o'clock in the morning I started from camp towards Bristow Station, and marched about a mile or less to where I halted, and there I remained at the head of my column until about two hours after daylight. I know that the artillery which followed the brigade, that is, a carriage or two of the artillery which followed the brigade, got stuck in the mud, or in a little creek, and had trouble in getting out. I also know that at 3 o'clock it was very dark, so dark that I used candles with my leading regiments to get through a little piece of woods which we left, in which we had been encamped. I also know that there is a bad place for artillery at Catlett's Station. There is a very steep hill there, and also a piece of woods where the road is winding, and which would have made it diffi cult for artillery carriages to pass along, especially on a dark night. In fact, along on all the road to Bristow Station there are several little places that would be very bad for artillery to pass over at night—almost impossible in a dark night—that might be passed over in the daytime.
Q. What caused you to halt when you did halt?—A. I halted because I found, when I got to the point where I did halt, that I had only a portion of my brigade with me. In the darkness, by some accident or other, we had become separated, and I halted to get my brigade to gether; and the artillery, I presume, is what detained us there until we started again. That is my impression; I do not know that positively. General Morell was in command of the division.
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Q. What time was reveille that night?—A. As near as I can recollect, reveille was at half-past one—about an hour and a half before we started.
Q. If you had attempted to start at one o'clock, what would have been the proper time for reveille, considering the condition of the com mand and the state of the night?—A. We generally allow two hours for a command to get ready; sometimes only an hour and a half, as in this instance. Reveille ought to have been, at least, at half-past eleven o'clock, if we had started at one o'clock; I mean, of course, to give the men time to get their breakfast. We allow time to get breakfast, and to get ready to march. An hour and a half is as little as any command can do that in
Q. With a view to reaching Bristow Station as early as possible that morning, and doing duty there, would it have been expedient or judi cious to have started at one o'clock that night?—A. I think decidedly not.
Q. Please state your grounds for that conclusion.—A. I think if we had started just at daylight that morning we would have arrived at Bristow Station, if the road had been clear, even sooner than we did by starting at three o'clock in the morning; for we would have made use of the two hours of daylight that we were lying in the road. I mean by that, of course, that I think if we had started by daylight we would have left camp properly, and would not have had the stoppages that we had.
Q. On the morning of the 29th of August do you know of disposition having been made to place your command and other parts of General Porter's corps in order for battle?—A. On the morning of the 29th we marched from Bristow Station to Manassas Junction. My brigade was leading the division, and following Sykes's division. We halted at Manassas about half an hour, when I received an order to countermarch, and proceed in the direction of Gainesville. After finding the direction, I moved on the road pointed out to me towards Gainesville. I had marched about two miles, having passed King's division in the road, when a countryman said, “Look out; a trooper has been taken here, just in front a short distance.” I asked him what forces were in front. He said none, except it was a few mounted men. I halted my brigade, threw four companies of the 62d Pennsylvania to the front, with instructions to move on in advance about half a mile, throw ing out flankers to the side and skirmishers to the front.
Q. About what hour of the day was this?—A. We left Manassas Junction, I should think, about 9 o'clock in the morning.
Q. Go on and state what then occurred.—A. I then moved on until we came to a cleared place, where our skirmishers commenced firing with the enemy's pickets, probably five miles from Manassas Junction. At this point General Porter rode up, and we halted. I also ordered the other eight companies of the 62d Pennsylvania to the front to support those that were already out as skirmishers. This regiment has twelve companies. General Porter then called together General Morell, General Butterfield, and myself. I think we all got off our horses. He said, “I have a communication to read to you.” He then read us a communication, I do not know by whom signed, but it was from General Pope— that is, I have always supposed it was, and understood it to be read as a communication from General Pope. We then went back to the rear on a hill, say 300 yards distant. A battery, I believe, was placed in position there. We were there some time, when General McDowell rode up. General McDowell and General Porter went off to the right of where we stood and held a conversation there for a half an hour probably, more
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or less. I was not present at the conversation, and cannot tell anything about that. I think there was a map taken out. After the conversa tion General McDowell rode to the right. I received an order, almost directly after General McDowell had left, to recall my pickets, and orders to move my command to the right. I attempted to go to the right, and moved probably 600 yards, until, with the head of my column, I crossed a railroad said to run to Gainesville. Here we met with obstructions which we could not get through. It was reported by somebody, I can not say who, “You can’t get through there.” We then faced about, and moved back to the hill where the battery I first referred to was stationed. As we were getting up to this hill the enemy's batteries opened fire upon us. My brigade was then placed in position in rear and to the right of the batteries, and remained there during considerable artillery firing; I cannot say how long. The disposition was certainly one to repel an attack. It was a very good position for that purpose.
Q. Do you remember the general character of that communication which was read to you by General Porter?—A. I can state my recollection of it. The communication, as I recollect it, was to this effect: that the troops would try to make a junction at Gainesville; but, although they might get to Gainesville, it might be necessary, before morning or that night, to fall back to Centreville on account of rations.
Q. To whom was the communication directed?—A. General Porter read the communication as coming from General Pope. I supposed it was addressed to General Porter from General Pope. I did not read it, and I could not swear positively that it was read correctly.
Q. From about 5 o'clock to about 7 o'clock of that afternoon, what was the position of the enemy in relation to the position of General Porter's corps?—A. That is a hard question to answer. I do not know much about the enemy; I only knew that during the day large clouds of dust were going to our front and to our left, from a point stated to us then to be passing through Thoroughfare Gap. There were large clouds of dust all that afternoon, in fact nearly all day, as nearly as I can recol lect, coming from a point said to us to be Thoroughfare Gap; I should say it was 3 or 4 miles from where I was, fully that; I except, of course, these batteries that opened on us about one o'clock. They were nearer; they were within 1,200 or 1,500 yards of us; we saw no force at 163 all; we saw scattering groups of horsemen or of infantry. I do. not believe we saw in any one group over 40 men.
Q. What was the character of the country, as seen from your posi tion, lying between you and the enemy?—A. At one point in front of us the woods came, I should think, to within 600 yards of us, and just back of the battery, where this battery was stationed, it appeared that it ran off into a valley. It had that appearance; I have not been over the country there. It would appear that men would come over the hill and look at us, and then they would drop back.
Q. Were there woods between you and the enemy which you would have had to pass through to reach them ?—A. Directly in front of us there were woods. There was a little cleared strip or field to our right which seemed to run right up to the top of this hill.
Q. At that period of the day was it practicable for General Porter, by a movement to his left, to outflank the enemy, or attack them on their right flank?—A. I can only state my opinion. I have stated that the enemy seemed to be coming from Thoroughfare Gap. In fact, there is not a doubt if that point was Thoroughfare Gap, that the enemy was coming through there all day. To have got in rear and flanked the enemy, General Porter would certainly have had to turn Thoroughfare Gap as I understand it, though I have never been over that ground.
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Q. Do you know of the receipt of any orders by General Porter from General Pope to attack the enemy on that afternoon?—A. I do not.
Q. Do you know of any orders having been given by General Porter on that day to attack the enemy?—A. I know that General Morell received one somewhere near sundown; it may have been a little before or a little after.
Q. What then took place?—A. We had started back towards Manassas Junction when this order came down the road. The order was carried by an orderly, and was stopped by Colonel Warren, who read it. We faced our command about immediately and started back. We were probably a mile and a half or two miles from the position referred to in my previous testimony as occupied by this battery. After I had faced my brigade about, I rode ahead to General Morell, who had received the order, and asked him if he was going to attack. He replied, in sub stance: “No, it is too late; and this order has been given under a wrong impression.” I do not know but that, in justice, I ought to state what the substance of that order was. The substance of that order was, “That the enemy are retiring or retreating; attack and pursue him vigorously.” That is as nearly as I can recollect it, the substance of it; General Morell said to me, “Colonel Marshall, who commands the pickets in front, states that the enemy are receiving re-enforcements.”
A member of the court objected to the witness stating what others had said; he desired him to confine his testimony to what he knew of his own knowledge.
The Accused wanted to know if the latter part of the answer already given by the witness would be allowed to remain upon the record.
At the request of a member of the court the court was cleared.
After some time the court was reopened, and the Judge Advocate announced that the court decide that the witness proceed in his testimony; the court expect that the Accused will confine the witness, as nearly as possible, to the subjects under investigation by this court.
Examination resumed by the ACCUSED :
Q. Do you know that the enemy were, in point of fact, retiring at the time you saw General Morell?—A. I feel very positive that he was not retiring just at dark.Q. Did your command spend the night in the place they then occupied, or very near it?—A. Yes, sir.
Q. About what hour the next morning did you commence to move?— A. Just as day was beginning to break.
Q. What did you know of the direction you were to take?—A. I un derstood from the staff officers that brought me the order that the division was to follow General Sykes.
Q. Please to state now, as briefly as possible, what route you took, and how it happened that you reached Centreville.—A. We went back the same road we came down from Manassas Junction. I went with my command to Centreville by direction of my commanding officer, General Morell, who accompanied me.
Q. Do you know what route General Sykes took?—A. I do not, ex cept from hearsay. -Q. In proceeding, as you did, towards Centreville, did you or not sup pose that you were following on after General Sykes?—A. I supposed we would find the entire corps at Centreville when we arrived there.
Q. Did you see any other forces belonging to General Porter's corps on the way?–A. Near Manassas Junction we passed General Sturgis, with Piatt's brigade. He said that he had been directed to follow Sykes, and wanted to know which way he had gone.
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Q. Did you take the road which you did take in the belief that it was the road that Sykes had taken, or that it would lead you to the same place where Sykes had gone?–A. I took the road believing that we would all meet at Centreville. I have reasons to believe that General Sykes took another road.
Q. When you say that you have reasons to believe that Sykes took another road, do you mean that you have reasons now, or that you had at the time?—A. I had at the time.
Q. What reasons had you at the time for thinking that he had taken a different road?—A. As we were going up the road a man with his hat and coat off stood by the side of the road and said: “The regulars— Martindale's and Butterfield's brigades—went this road.” That is the only reason I had to believe that they took a different road.
Q. Were you present at the headquarters of General Porter on the evening of the 27th of August?—A. No, sir.
The examination by the Accused here closed.
Examination by the JUDGE ADVOCATE:
Q. Did I understand you correctly as stating that you do not know why the detention until two hours after daylight occurred on the morn ing of the 28th of August?—A. As I stated before, I know that some of the carriages of the artillery got stuck in a little stream, and after I had halted General Morell directed me to remain until I got further orders.
Q. You have mentioned various obstacles to the passage of artillery over that road as you passed over it on the morning of the 28th of August. Do you know whether General Porter knew of the ex istence of those obstacles on the evening of the 27th of August?— A. I do not. –
Q. Did General Porter make known to you and to the other generals of his corps the urgent reasons assigned by General Pope for his corps to be at Bristow Station by daylight on the morning of the 28th ?–A. He did not make them known to me. I do not know what he made known to his other officers.
Q. Did you, on the 29th, make a reconnoissance to the front, or order one to be made, to ascertain the force of the enemy that opened their artillery upon your troops?—A. Not after the artillery opened, that I know of. Before that we had a whole regiment to the front as skirm ishers. We took three mounted prisoners, I know.
Q. Do you believe you had in front of you any considerable force of the enemy?—A. Yes, sir; I believe that in the course of the day we had the larger part of Lee's army.
Q. Immediately in front of you, I mean. I do not mean in the remote distance.—A. According to my recollection and impression at the time, they formed a line a little obliquely to our front, extending back to Thoroughfare Gap. They were coming from Thoroughfare Gap towards us.
Q. You mean by that to say that in the course of the day they passed by you in your front; not that they passed in their march, and put themselves in position for action.—A. I mean that heavy bodies of troops were passing from Thoroughfare Gap down towards our front all day long—that is, that they passed. Some of them may have been three miles, some of them may have been five miles, and some of them may not have been over two thousand yards from us.
Q. Do you not know that the field of the battle of the 29th was some two miles to your right, and did you not hear firing in that direction all day?—A. On the 29th I heard no firing whatever, except artillery at a
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long distance. That is, I can call to mind no other firing. In the even ing a little after dark there were some very heavy volleys of musketry, the enemy evidently driving our troops right before them. That musketry was to our right and front, I should say two miles, may be not so far; may be further. I should have stated, when I stated that I heard no other firing but artillery, that in marching we had some skirmish firing. –
Q. You spoke of having returned from the movement you made to your right in consequence of obstacles that you encountered. What was the character of those obstacles, and what efforts did you make to overcome them?—A. I led off my column. We ran up into some little thick pine bushes. We halted there. The next order I got was to move back again. Some one reported that we could not get through. I made no reconnoissance whatever myself.
Q. What road did General Sturgis, with General Piatt's brigade, take from Manassas, when that general inquired of you what road General Sykes had taken?—A. They followed immediately in the rear of the brigade that I commanded.
Q. Why did you not follow General Sykes, if such were your orders?— A. That morning, before leaving the position we had occupied all night, I was directed to bring up the rear. I threw out pickets of my brigade and relieved all the others, and after the other commands were in motion, as reported to me by General Morell, I recalled my pickets, and got in motion as soon as possible. The other commands must have had a half an hour the start of me. We never overtook them at all; never got in sight of them. –
Q. How far was your front from the Gainesville and Centreville pike do you suppose?—A. I do not know.
Q. Do you know whether General Sturgis and General Piatt, with their forces, reached the field, and took part in the action of the 30th of August?—A. I do not.
Q. Did you or not, on your march that morning, hear the guns of that battle !—A. No, sir; we heard them after we arrived at Centreville.
Q. Not until then ?—A. No, sir. I should think we heard them about four o'clock in the afternoon at Centreville. –
Q. Did you or not hear General Porter, at any time during the 27th, 28th, 29th, and 30th of August, criticise General Pope's military con duct, or his capacity for generalship, unfavorably 2 If so, will you state the Substance of Such conversation ?—A. I never did. I never heard him, to my recollection, mention General Pope's name but once. On the 29th of August General Porter said: “My orders are very conflicting. I first receive them from this officer, and then from that officer; officers. whom I do not know, I have never seen, and they are brought to me by orderlies. I have written General Pope a note requesting of him here after to send all his orders to me in writing.” That is the only time that I recollect of ever hearing General Porter mention General Pope's name. As I have stated before, when he read that communication to his generals he stated that it was from General Pope. In reference to any transactions between himself and General Pope, I never heard him speak of him but that once, at the time I have mentioned.
Examination by the Judge Advocate here closed.
Examination by the Court:
Q. When on your march to Centreville, on the morning of the 30th of August, did you suppose your command was advancing, or retiring,
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with respect to the enemy?—A. I cannot say that I formed any idea about that.
Q. Were the troops that you supposed were coming through Thorough fare Gap taking position in your front as they arrived; or were they passing to your right, in the direction of Groveton?—A. They were going further towards the mountains. They passed as it were in our front, but were some distance from us to our right and to the left of Centreville. That was my impression; of course, I do not know.
Q. Did or not the order which you received from General Morell to march to Centreville on the morning of the 30th emanate from General Porter ?–A. That I did not, know at the time. General Morell showed me, on the afternoon of the 30th, about four o'clock, the order he had received to follow Sykes. –
Q. On the march from Warrenton Junction to Bristow Station, on the morning of the 28th of August, what was the position of your brigade in the corps of General Porter ?—A. I started out ahead, but I halted. After that the regulars, Sykes's division, were moving towards Bristow Station, and passed us. After that I occupied the centre of General Morell's division; was then second brigade in the division.
Q. At what time in the day of the 29th of August did General McDowell ride up and have a conference with General Porter, and at what time did he leave?—A. General McDowell rode up, I should judge, somewhere between 12 and 1 o'clock, and he remained there, I should think, a half an hour. That is my recollection.
Q. What was the position of your brigade in the division of General Morell, when marching in column towards Gainesville, on the 29th of August 2—A. I was in front. –
Q. What distance did General Morell’s division move in retreat on the afternoon of the 29th, previous to the order for attacking the enemy?— A. I should think my brigade, as I have stated, moved a mile and a half Or two miles—not far from a mile and a half. I do not think the bat tery left the hill at all. - -
Q. You have stated that you did not think it judicious to leave your position on the morning of the 28th until daylight: would you not have considered it judicious to move at one o'clock in case you had had posi tive orders from your commanding general to do so?—A. All orders should be obeyed when it is practicable to obey them. It certainly was not practicable to move a large body of troops at one o'clock on the night of the 27th or the morning of the 28th, and over a road about which we had no knowledge. - -
Q. You state that the enemy were going to your right, and rather to the left of Centreville. Would or would not that line of march have taken them to the battle-field on your right and rear to Groveton?—A. I do not know where Groveton is. I have never passed over the field between Gainesville and Centreville, except from Bull Run to Centre Ville.
Q. Will you look at the map which is on the table and see if you can not answer that question more satisfactorily ?–A. (Having looked at the map.) According to this map it would have taken them somewhere in the neighborhood of Groveton.
Q. Would it have been practicable to have moved infantry towards Bristow Station had the march been commenced at one o'clock on the morning of the 28th—such a body of infantry as was at Warrenton Junction at that time?—A. If we had got into the road, and started at one o'clock, the first brigade would probably have got there if the road had been clear. We always march, first a brigade, then a battery, then
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a brigade, and then a battery, and so on. The first battery would have blocked the road somewhere, so that the rest would have had to remain until daylight before they could move; probably at the first run, right there in our own camp.
Q. The question supposes that there was to be no artillery; it relates to infantry alone.—A. It is probable that we would have got through one brigade of Morell's division.
Q. Have you stated that on the morning of the 30th you had reasons to believe that General Sykes had taken a different route from the one that you took?—A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why did you not follow the road that you thought that General Sykes had taken ?—A. I went with my commanding officer, General Morell. I had nothing to do with the direction at all. I was merely a subordinate.
Q. You have been asked whether infantry without artillery could have made their way, on the night of the 27th of August and on the morning of the 28th, to Bristow Station. Will you state whether, 168 in your opinion, any officer receiving an order of that description would have moved without his artillery, unless he was specially ordered to do so?—A. Most certainly not.
Q. Was General Morell present on the 30th when you received the information from the man, of whom you have spoken, as to the route taken by the regulars?—A. He was not.
Q. At what time on the 30th, if at all, did you move from Centreville towards the battle-field?—A. I should think about 5 o'clock in the afternoon.
Q. What prevented your getting to the field?—A. The road was blocked up by wagons and stragglers coming towards Centreville, and the bridge at Cab Run was broken through, so that it was impossible to get past it at all.
Q. Did you go to the bridge, or how far did you go?—A. I got to the bridge with the head of my brigade. –
Q. You have stated that the enemy, as you supposed from the column of dust, were moving in the direction of which you have spoken. Would you have known whether they were forming in your front, or would the reports, if any, have been made to your commanding officer, General Morell?—A. I suppose that it would have been reported to General Morell, though I do not know. I cannot state what other officers would do under similar circumstances. –
Q. You have been asked how far you went when you were retreating on the evening of the 29th. Did you understand your corps to be re treating at all that night?—A. No; I do not know that I did. I supposed that we were going to change position somehow; that we had failed to get through on the right during the day, and that we were going to shift to some other position; where I did not know. We did not connect with anything on our right or on our left.
Q. Had you an opportunity of seeing General Porter from the time he joined the command of General Pope, and of witnessing his actual con duct on the march?—A. I saw General Porter several times.
Q. Had you any conversation with him, from time to time, when you saw him?–A. No particular conversation that I can call to mind. I recollect speaking to him. –
Q. From what you saw of his conduct, and from what you heard from him, will you state whether he exhibited any indisposition to do his duty to his commander-in-chief and to the country?—A. I supposed at the time, and I have ever supposed, that General Porter exhibited his
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usual energy and zeal to move ahead. One thing that made me think so was our long march from Barnett's ford to Warrenton Junction, which nearly broke down the whole command. Now I come to think of it, I do call to mind a little conversation that occurred at General Porter's camp at Bristow Station. He said that General Ricketts occupied Thoroughfare Gap, and we thought we had Jackson in a trap, and that we would nab him; and the next morning, when we moved, I thought we were going down to be in at the taking of Jackson. That is the only thing I call to mind now.
Q. Did you mean to say, in answer to the question about moving an army, when positively ordered to do so, that it is not common in emer gencies to move infantry in the night, and leave in force to bring up the artillery afterwards?—A. I have yet to know an instance of our leaving our division artillery when we have been moving by land.
Q. You say that you had failed to get through to the right during the day of the 29th of August. Will you state what efforts were made by you, or by General Porter, to get through on the right during that day ?—A. I merely obeyed orders. My position was at the head of my brigade. What efforts General Porter made I am not aware of.
The examination of this witness was here closed.
From: https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951002581950u&view=1up&seq=163&skin=2021 , pp. 155-163
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