Monday, August 19, 2024

The 4th Michigan speaks about Griffin

 

Excerpts from  Crawford, K., & Bertera, M.N. (2010). The 4th Michigan Infantry in the Civil War. (first cloth ed.). East Lansing: Michigan State University Press. https://muse.jhu.edu/book/6969.

 

Griffin’s Battery at Yorktown:   

p. 56:   April 5, 1862:  ” The regiment’s assignment was to support Capt. Charles Griffin’s battery, part of their brigade’s artillery, and soon these and other Union guns were firing back from a hill off the road. The Michigan men took positions to the right of the batteries, partially screened from the Rebel gunners by some pine woods and brush. Dr. [David] Chamberlain wrote there were remnants of trenches here, dug back in the American Revolution. The men of the regiment quickly began to improve, extend, and enlarge these old works as the artillery blasted. “Pieces of shell were flying in every direction,” the doctor wrote. Edward Taylor said that Griffin’s gunners silenced a battery of three Rebel cannon. “Every shell he [Griffin] threw exploded within their works,” he wrote.

 

April 9, 1862:  

p. 57 [Yorktown]   “Their brigade was pulled back the next day, shifting about a mile to the right, or east, to camp with Porter’s division in a peach orchard on an old farm near the York River. The soldiers again went to work digging new trenches. Henry Seage of Company E wrote that a Confederate sharpshooter fired at the men from a hiding place high in a chimney of a burned-out house at the time, but the brigade’s artillery commander, Charles Griffin, brought out a gun “and soon made a ruin of the chimney, reb and all.” The weather continued fair and foul, but at last new tents arrived.”

 

9/19/62            Shepherdstown Ford

p. 107   “We had only been out but a short time when Gen. Griffin rode down and ordered Col. Childs to cross the river with his regiment and take the artillery on the other side,” Vesey wrote. The brigade commander called the 4th Michigan to attention. “Men,” Griffin said, “we are ordered to ford the river, and dismount those pieces over there. Are you willing to go?” The soldiers cheered.”

 

12/13/62          Fredericksburg

p.  118  

“Sweitzer’s men lay down. But there was no way for Union soldiers in front of them to fight in the open for very long while exposed to the heavy fire. Finally these men turned and retreated. [Chaplain John] Seage wrote that General Griffin was on the field and saw what was happening, ordering the Second Brigade to remain in place and not let the retreating soldiers disrupt them. “Lie still, boys, and let them pass through,” he ordered, according to Seage’s Fredericksburg account, and the fleeing soldiers jumped over the rows of prone men, heading back to town. Now it was the Second Brigade’s turn to attack. By some reports, it was 4:00 p.m. or later.”

 

 

5/3/63              Chancellorsville

p. 142   “Whilst the ball was going, Gen. Hooker came where we were and sat down amongst us for about an hour,” [Lieut. Charles H.] Salter wrote from the battlefield. “He told Gen. Griffin that our position must be held at all hazards; and that everything depended on our being able to hold this place. Gen. Griffin told him that he had two of his best regiments here, and could hold it against all the

[p. 143]  devils in hell, and that the rebels had not men enough in the Southern Confederacy to take it.” The anecdote would be proudly remembered and retold, with variations, for years by men of both Michigan regiments.”

 

5/30/64            Bethesda Church

p. 218   Another clash was taking shape as the Second Brigade moved to the front at 6:00 a.m.

the next morning, May 30. Shortly before they marched, Lt. James W. Vesey of Sturgis quickly

wrote a letter to his hometown newspaper, since he was sure they were going into battle when

his gruff division commander went by, his hat cocked at an angle. “Gen. Griffin just rode by our

lines, his hat was at the ‘fighting pitch,’” Vesey noted. “We will fight today. It is a sure sign when

‘Grif’ wears his hat a little on the left.” Vesey wasn’t wrong. The Michigan troops advanced and

the sound of skirmish fire was soon crackling over the countryside.

 

6/18/64            Petersburg

p. 225   The morning of June 18 dawned and the Second Brigade moved toward the front and then

angled to the south into some woods. Col. Jacob Sweitzer, the brigade commander, promised

he would hold the 4th Michigan back and “will call on us only in the case of urgent need,”

Bancroft noted. Moses Luce later wrote that Gen. Charles Griffin, their division commander,

told the soldiers of the 4th Michigan that they should vote on whether they were willing to go

into the fighting that day. According to Luce, the men of the regiment voted they would attack,

if needed, though apparently some men decided to desert rather than risk being sent into battle.

p.226    Around 6:00 p.m., the regiments of the Second Brigade were sent in to charge a section of the Confederate line—all of the regiments, that is, but the 4th Michigan. With the three-year hitch of more than 150 officers and men ending in just hours, a commanding officer, likely Gen. Charles Griffin, allowed the Michigan regiment to remain behind. One member of the brigade remembered that the 4th Michigan was excluded from the order to attack when the rest of the troops moved out to assault the Rebel position that evening. The fighting was terrible and scores of men fell dead and wounded, but the Confederate line did not break.

Tuesday, July 30, 2024

Charles Griffin’s Second Bull Run: Griffin Walks Away Unhurt From A Second Debacle

 Charles Griffin’s two worst moments on the battle field came near Manassas, Virginia although under entirely distinct circumstances.  Although Griffin’s role in the Union collapse on Henry Hill at First Bull Run was subject to Congressional questioning, Griffin’s career was not impacted and would ascend quickly during the Peninsula campaign.  On the U.S. Army’s return to Bull Run, however, in late August 1862, Griffin found even greater controversy that threatened to derail his career and contributed to the ruin of his commander Fitz-John Porter.  

After Griffin’s first triumph as a brigade commander when holding the Union’s far left at Malvern Hillon July 1, 1862, his battered Fifth Corps retreated along with the rest of the Army of the Potomac on the Peninsula to the defensive position near Harrison City.   Griffin’s 2nd Brigade, of the 1st Division of the Fifth Corps, had suffered the most dead and wounded among all Army of the Potomac brigades during the Seven Days battles.  The weakened brigade was bolstered by the addition of the 14th New York infantry regiment giving him five regiments, with 1,717 men reporting for duty (as of Sept. 1, 1862) [OR Vol XII, Part 3 p. 795]. 

According to Powell’s history of the Fifth Corps, Porter received orders to move the Fifth Corps to Newport News where the corps embarked on transports on August 20, arriving at Acquia Creek and immediately moving by rail to Fredericksburg where the corps arrived on August 23.  (Powell, p. 193).  

The Fifth Corps marched up the north bank of the Rappahannock River, arriving at Bealton Station on August 27th where Porter received orders from Gen. John Pope to proceed to Warrenton as rapidly as possible. Griffin estimated that his brigade marched 18 or 19 miles on the Aug 277th and the men were very fatigued, with many straggling.  This relentless travel for nearly two weeks, took a toll on the soldiers who lacked water and were reduced to half rations for several days (Powell p. 196; OR XIX  p 982).   

The V Corps was ordered by the army commander John Pope to proceed to Bristoe Station, where they arrived on the morning of August 28 and taking “position on the north side of Broad Run” and remained there.   (Powell p. 198).  

Early on the morning of August 29, Pope ordered Porter to Centreville, and the corps marched from Bristoe to Manassas Junction.  At Manassas, new orders were received directing the corps to Gainesville. With Morell’s division in the lead, and Griffin at the head of the column, the corps headed up the Gainesville-Manassas Junction road. (Jermann p. 95).  

After marching a couple of miles toward Gainesville, Griffin received a report from a Union cavalryman of a small number of Confederate “mounted men” in the vicinity.  Griffin stopped his brigade and sent four companies of the 62nd Penn ahead as skirmishers and flankers. The brigade then resumed their march until coming to Dawkins Branch where the 62nd Penn skirmishers exchanged fire with Confederate pickets (Jermann p. 95).   Porter arrived, ordering a halt to the march, and Griffin sent forward the rest of the 62ndPenn to support the skirmish line.  At some point, Griffin’s brigade took “three mounted prisoners.”  [OR p. 986] Gen. McDowell arrived and spoke with Porter, Griffin was ordered to proceed “to the right” with the aim of connecting with other Union units. Griffin’s brigade crossed the railroad but shortly “ran into ravines too steep for the artillery he needed to take with him” [Marvel p. 354] or “thick pine bushes” in Griffin’s words.  Griffin was returning to a Union artillery position  when enemy batteries opened fire and his brigade moved to the rear of the Union batteries and prepared to repel an attack.  Around sundown, after Morell’s division started moving back down the road to Manassas Junction, they received an order to attack the enemy. Griffin turned his brigade around and marched a couple of miles in the direction of Gainesville.   Morell delcared that it was too late to attack. Porter deferred to Morell direction to stop for the night – a decision that would have dire ramifications for Porter’s career.

Before daylight on August 30, Morell received an order from Porter to withdraw in the direction of Manassas.  Morell’s division moved out, this time with Griffin’s brigade last “to bring up the rear and cover the retreat.” (Jermann p. 116).    By the time Griffin brought in his skirmishers and moved out, he had lost sight of the rest of the division.   Morell and then a staff member rode ahead to try to locate the column.  Unknown to Morell and Griffin, however, the other brigades had turned up Sudley Springs Road toward the battlefield.   Morell believed that Porter’s intended destination was Centreville.  Accordingly, Griffin passed the Sudley Springs Road turnoff, ignoring the direction of “a man without a hat and coating” who pointed up Sudley Springs Rd, and proceeded instead along the Manassas Junction road to Centreville, inadvertently taking his brigade out of the battle.   According to Capt. Augustus Marin of Batt C MA Light Artillery, Griffin’s men arrived at Centreville around noon and “went into camp.” [OR Vol XII, Pt 2, p. 466] 

Morelll testified that he arrived at Centreville and discovered he had taken the wrong direction.  He had expected to find Pope and Porter at Centreville but heard that Pope went to the front and that Porter was probably with him.   Morell said he sent a note to Porter stating that he was at Centreville “and that as soon as Griffin’s brigade had got rations they would move on to the front.  Griffin’s commissary immediately went to work to get rations for the men.  Morell stated that he heard the firing of artillery in the distance, the first he had heard during the day and told Griffin that “I heard firing, and that we must move immediately.”   [OR Vol XII Part 2, Sup. p. 971]  Griffin “spoke of his men being out of rations, which, he said, were being issued then, and that they were very much fatigued.” Morell replied that he would go without waiting for Griffin, and that Griffin  must “follow as soon as possible, and do the best he could.”  Griffin’s brigade departed Centreville around 5pm but found the road blocked with stragglers coming from the battle toward Centreville, advanced about two miles, and found the bridge at Cub Run broken.  Griffin’s brigade stood alone in the V Corps in suffering no casualties during Second Bull Run. 

Jermann explains that neither Griffin nor General Sturgis (who made the same route error)  were ever told where they were supposed to go other than to follow Sykes’ division, which had long moved ahead out of sight, and which they believed was headed to Centreville.   Porter had not posted a competent staff officer at the Sudley Springs Road turn off to show the correct route. (Jermann p. 119) 

John Pope’s Campaign Against Charles Griffin

One veteran from Griffin’s division later wrote that it appeared to his men that General Griffin led a charmed life, as he repeatedly exposed himself to enemy fire on the battlefield without suffereing a scratch.  Griffin’s immunity from injury extended to army politics too when John Pope sought revenge for what Pope believed to be Griffin’s outright insubordination on August 30th.

Pope was outraged by Griffin’s conduct and testified that he believed that Griffin had remained at Centreville “in sight of the battle-field” without then coming to the field, implying that Griffin was deliberately insubordinate in refusing to engage his brigade in the battle.   Pope testified that initially he informed Porter that while he was not about to report Porter to Washington, Pope “felt bound to do so in the case of Griffin.” [OR Vo. XII Part 2 Supplement p. 837-8]. 

Shortly after the battle, Pope had written to Halleck that Griffin “had manufactured an excuse to keep his brigade out of the fight on August 30,” Citing “reports of open criticism from the habitually gruff Griffin, Pope lodged a complaint of ‘constant talk’ against him from those two generals [Porter and Griffin], ‘indulged in publicly and in promiscuous company.’”  [Marvel, p. 386 -7]

Gideon Welles recorded in his diary that Pope met with him and Lincoln on Sept. 4, 1862 and presented a draft report on the recent battle.  Welles observed that the report, in its draft form, would cause “war among the generals, who are now more ready to fight each other than the enemy.”  When leaving the meeting, Pope told Welles that “all his misfortunes are owing to the persistent determination of McClellan, Franklin, and Porter, aided by Ricketts, Griffin, and some others who were predetermined he should not be successful.  They preferred he said, that the country should be ruined rather than he should triumph.” Welles Diary.  

According to historian William Marvel, Lincoln sought to mollify Pope and “ordered a court of inquiry to investigate Porter’s conduct on August 29, as well as Griffin’s departure from the battlefield on August 30” via a special order dated Sept. 5.  “Stanton relieved Porter, Franklin and Griffin from duty ‘until the charges against them can be investigated by a court of inquiry.’ The court met the next day, but because Mansfield was absent, it promptly adjourned.”  Griffin was back on duty in a few days.   [Marvel pp. 397-8]

Pope presented his allegations against Griffin in his after battle report.  Pope wrote that one of Porter’s  brigades “under General Griffin, got around to Centreville and remained there  during the whole of the next day’s battle without coming on the field, though in full view of it, while General Griffin himself spent the day in making ill-natured strictures upon the general commanding (see paper marked D) the action in the presence of a promiscuous assemblage.”   This “paper marked D” consisted of the following account from Col. Speed Butler written on Sept. 3, 1862:  “Was ordered to Centreville by MG Pope on Saturday August 30. General Griffin arrived there with his command at 11 o’clock , coming from the direction of Manassas Junction. He moved his brigade to the north of the town, halted it, and came to General Pope’s headquarters, where he remained one hour, conversing with Lieutenant-Colonel Myers and myself.  During this conversation Lt Col Myers asked him several times why his (General Griffin’s) brigade was not in the fight. General Griffin replied, ‘Never mind; I do not care.”  He said that he was tired of being commanded by staff officers, and asked what Pope had ever done that he should be made a major-general. Also spoke disrespectfully and sneeringly of other superior officers; said that he heard that morning that General McClellan was to take command; hope that it was true. He then rode toward his command, and about two hours after sent an officer to ask whether he could get shoes for his men.” [OR Vol XII, Part 2, p. 15 , No. 1 Rep of MG John Pope, US Army of operations of Army of VA 6/26-9/2/62; p. 18 (Inclosure D].    

Pope continued later in his report to contrast Griffin’s conduct with Sturgis and Piatt each of whom, though similarly straying from correct route, redirected their commands “as soon as it was discovered that Griffin did not intend to go forward to the field of battle, and reported to me late in the afternoon of that day. …  [Sturgis and Piatt] deserve especial mention for the soldierly feeling which induced them, after being thus misled and with the bad example of Griffin before their eyes, to push forward with such zeal and alacrity to the field of battle…” [OR Vol. XII, Part 2, pp. 48-49]

At his own court martial, Porter defended Griffin (and Morell) stating that it was “wholly prudent and proper for General Morell’s division, in moving away under these orders from the immediate front of the enemy in force, to use careful precautions to prevent or repel the assault of that enemy upon our rear. General Griffin’s brigade was detailed for that special duty, and I say he is to be commended for his attention to the execution of that important duty, although it resulted in his accidental failure, by reason of missing his road without my knowledge, to make his way direct to the battle-field in pursuance of my order.“  [OR XII Part 2, sup.  P. 1100]

More fallout: 

Pope continued to complain to Halleck about Griffin (and Porter and McClellan)  Halleck wrote to Pope on October, 10, 1862: “Again, you complain that Porter and Griffin have not been tried on your charges against them. You know that a court was ordered for their trial and that it was suspended because all officers were required in the field. A new court has been ordered, and they are to be tried, and the grounds of your charged to be fully investigated.”  Pope, who had already been dispatched to Minnesota replied to Halleck on Oct. 20, 1862:  “Why are McClellan, Porter, and Griffin retained in high commands with such charges of treachery and baseness hanging over them? Do you not believe these charges are true? Are they not substantiated to your satisfaction by the papers attached to the report containing them?…. You assume that I confine my charges to Porter and Griffin. My report tells another story. The greatest criminal is McClellan, and my charge is direct and plain against him.”   [OR XII, Part 3, pp. 820-1]

On Oct. 17, 1862, McClellan complained to Halleck that Butterfield and Griffin were absent attending a court of inquiry in Washington and, along with Porter leaving for DC, their corps “will suffer from the absence of so many general officers.” [OR XIX, part 2, p. 439]    Griffin testified before the  Porter Court Martial proceedings on Dec. 29, 1862.  

Summary:  

Griffin’s conduct during the Second Bull Run campaign and leadership of his brigade seems entirely prudent and professional until the afternoon of Aug. 30th.  His operations continuously reflected reasonable caution: in throwing out skirmishers on Aug 28th when he led the corps on the march, as well as the careful withdrawal on the morning of Aug. 29th when he held the corps’ rear, although this deliberateness caused him to lose sight of the brigades he was supposed to follow.  He had nothing to do with the Morell’s refusal to attack on the evening of August 28th which decision Morell reached, in any event, because of darkness and not out of some attempt to undermine Pope at Porter’s direction.  Nor was Griffin responsible for the failure on Aug. 29th to take the Sudley Springs Road turnoff which Porter had neglected to mark clearly for his command, and, in any event, Griffin was subordinate to Morell on this march and Morell guided Griffin’s brigade and other troops onto Centreville. 

The one area in which it seems that Griffin may have blundered is in his apparently casual handling of his troops once they arrived at Centreville around noon on Aug. 29th when Morell discovered his mistake.  It seems surprising that Griffin took four hours or more, to get his brigade moving again in the direction of the battle.  Maybe it’s to Griffin’s credit that he prioritized caring for his exhausted and hungry men from a brigade which had recently suffered enormous casualties over Morell’s command to head west toward the fighting.   Pope, however, considered Griffin’s conduct, as reported to him by Butler, as deliberate insubordination.  I have no idea how long it would take an exhausted brigade of about 1,800 men who had gone “into camp” and received rations to form up again and march toward battle.  Sturgis and Piatt with their regiments apparently managed this feat in much less time.   Nor is there any way to explain Speed Butler’s report which makes Griffin sound flippant and bordering on willful misconduct.  While there is no reason to infer that Griffin sought to sabotage Pope by withholding his brigade from battle, Griffin’s deliberateness of action over the previous few days certainly came close to the line of negligent performance of duty when he allowed his brigade to rest and eat on the afternoon of August 29th.   Like his previous controversy at First Bull Run, Griffin’s performance at Second Bull Run also ended before a committee on inquiry.   On both occasions, however, Griffin’s career did not appear to suffer any consequences and the matter was put behind him.  For his commander, Fitz John Porter, however, the results were catastrophic. 

Sources:  

Donald R. Jermannn, Fitz-John Porter, Scapegoat of Second Manassas, The Rise, Fall and Rise of the General Accused of Disobedience (McFarland, 2009).

John Hennessy, Return to Bull Run, 

William Marvel, Radical Sacrifice: the Rise and Ruin of Fitz John Porter, UNC Press

Gideon Welles Diary: https://archive.org/stream/diaryofgideonwel00well/diaryofgideonwel00well_djvu.txt

The War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Official Records)


Griffin on the Peninsula: from Captain to General

Captain Griffin began the Peninsula campaign in March 1862 as chief of artillery for Fitz John Porter’s division in Samuel Heintzelman’s Third Corps of the Army of the Potomac.  Griffin’s command consisted of Batteries C (Capt. Augustus P. Martin) and E (Capt. Allen) of the Massachusetts Light Artillery, the Battery C First Rhode Island Light Artillery (Capt. William B. Weeden) and Battery D Fifth United States “Griffin’s Battery” (Lt. Henry W. Kingsbury) .  With reorganization of the Army of the Potomac, Griffin’s artillery was assigned to FJ Porter’s V Corps. When George Morrell was promoted to division head, Griffin was eventually promoted as brevet brigadier general to lead Morrell’s brigade   Heavily engaged also at Gaines Mill and then Malvern Hill, Griffin’s new brigade suffered the highest number of deaths and wounded among all brigades in the Army of the Potomac during the Seven Days campaign (June 25 through July 2).  Among total casualties, Griffin’s 1,153 trailed only Meade’s brigade which had a high number of captured and missing.   Griffin’s brigade incurred 18% of deaths suffered by the V Corps, and 10.5% of all deaths incurred by the Army of the Potomac during the Seven Days.  The brigade also incurred 21% of V Corps wounds and nearly 10% of all AOP wounds. 

Porter’s division embarked for the Peninsula on March 22, 1862.  Griffin’s command consisted of Batteries C (Capt. Augustus P. Martin) and E (Capt. Allen) of the Massachusetts Light Artillery, the Battery C First Rhode Island Light Artillery (Capt. William B. Weeden) and Battery D Fifth United States “Griffin’s Battery” (Lt. Henry W. Kingsbury) .  Porter’s brigade commanders were John H. Martindale, John W. Morrell, and Dan Butterfield, all brigadier generals.  

Siege of Yorktown

On April 4, Porter’s division was ordered to move out from Hampton, Virginia toward Yorktown.  After repairing bridges at Big Bethel, and a small skirmish at Harwood’s Bridge, Porter sent Griffin’s battery (presumably just Batt. D5US?) with Morell’s brigade and cavalry “forward to Cockletown to occupy the junction of Yorktown and Ship Point roads.” 

The next day, April 5, Porter united his division at Cockletown and moved toward Yorktown in heavy rain until encountering Confederate infantry and artillery near the intersection of the Yorktown and Warwick Court House roads.  Morrell’s brigade deployed to develop the enemy.  Around 10:30AM, Griffin posted Weeden’s RI battery and D5US to shell the enemy, and according to Porter “shots from both were directed with judgment and skill, and the enemy’s infantry were driven rapidly from their huts, tents and ramparts to seek shelter.”  Confederate artillery returned fire with “far superior caliber,” but Griffin and Weeden “soon drove the artillerists to cover.” [Porter OR XI p. 286]   Morrell reported that  Weeden (six 3” rifled guns) and the D5US batteries “were moved to the front and in the open field to the right, about midway between the White House or Observatory and the town” supported by Woodbury’s 4th Michigan on the right, and McQuade’s 14th New York to the left of the batteries.  [Morell. P. 299]  Weeden reported that the batteries first fired on entrenchments about 1500 to 1600 years distant, scattering infantry and then moved up 150 years to fire on entrenchments about 1800 to 1900 yards distant.  One private in Weeden’s RI battery died of wounds.  

When Martindale arrived, Porter sent him to the left to relieve Morrell.   “The appearance of a large force on the left and the fire of artillery on Martindale prompted Porter to send portions of Griffin (2 10-pounder Parrotts under Lt Hazlett) and Martin (3 light 12-pounders) batteries to support Martindale, but leaving guns from each battery with Weeden. “These Captain Griffin posted so advantageously that their fire soon drove the enemy’s infantry from their works and checked the fire of their artillery.”  Two privates were killed and three men wounded in Martin’s battery (CMA) but “their wounds were not of a serious character.”

Porter concluded his report for April 4-6 with praise for Griffin: “Like credit is due to Weeden’s battery and the sections of Griffin’s under Lieutenants Kingsbury and Hazlett. All were property posted by Captain Griffin, admirably served, and with the infantry gave assurance that any duty hereafter required of them will be performed with satisfaction, and all which may be expected of them will be realized.” [OR XI, p. 286]

Through April 10, Porter’s division remained in front of Yorktown, guarding from the York River to the Warwick River.  On April 10, the division moved to “the plateau south of Wormley’s Creek, and to picket from York River to the Yorktown road” – being relieved west of the Yorktown Road by Hamilton’s division.   On April 27, McClellan appointed Porter “director of the siege” of Yorktown.  On the morning May 4, Porter’s troops (62PA and 22MA) discovered that Yorktown lines were abandoned.  Porter in his report for the month, expressed his “gratification at the gallant and efficient service of the division artillery, under the immediate direction of Capt. Charles Griffin, Fifth Artillery, whose reports of service rendered and losses in respective batteries were forwarded in proper time. Often exposed to hot fire from the enemy and meeting with some losses, these batteries were examples of superior discipline and instruction, and the conspicuous coolness, gallantry, bravery, and skill of the officers and men merited the highest commendation.” Porter noted that during the siege, artillery officers superintended “the erection of batteries and magazines, laying platforms, mounting guns, etc.” [Porter, OR XI, p. 315].  

Question: where was Porter’s division from May 4 to May 27?

Porter’s division did not take part in Battle at Williamsburg on May 5, 1862.  On May 18, Porter was promoted to V Corps commander, with Morrell promoted to division commander and Col. McQuade (14NY) appointed to command Morrell’s brigade.  

The 4th Michigan (Woodbury) from McQuade’s (recently Morrell) brigade participated in a skirmish on May 23 near Mechanicsville.

Hanover Court House: May 27.   

On May 27, Porter marched with Morell’s division from New Bridge.  Griffin’s command was further divided: Battery C Mass Artillery was sent to Martindale’s brigade, Battery E was sent to McQuade’s brigade, and Battery D 5US to Butterfield’s brigade.  

Griffin remained with D5US (“Griffin’s Battery”) on May 27.  Griffin’s Battery (with Lt Kingsbury and Lt. Charles E. Hazlett) followed Martindale’s brigade as it moved west along the Richmond road.  After Martindale made contact with Confederate troops, he sent Griffin’s battery to relieve and support Battery M 2US Artillery (Benson) and Martin’s battery (CMA) near the intersection of the railroad and the Richmond road.  Placed between the 2ME and 22MA regiments, Griffin’s battery “commenced shelling the woods across the railroad and over a wheatfield.”  [Col. Charles W. Roberts 2ME  Vol XI, p. 707] Two guns under Hazlett silenced two enemy guns after spirited firing that lasted about an hour.  Martin lost two guns in this action.  At 3pm, Griffin’s battery then moved with Martindale and Morrel back toward the Cash Corner intersection, proceeding 2 miles until hearing firing in the rear and then turned back following McQuade.  About 5pm, the battery commenced firing on the enemy which held the position the US battery had occupied at 1pm.  McQuade  advanced along the Richmond road to support Griffin’s battery “which had taken position to open fire on the retreating enemy.”  

According to Morrell, “Griffin’s battery was placed in the field to the left of the road, near the position that Benson’s had occupied.”  US infantry soon routed the enemy guns, and Kingsbury moved the battery to the front, advancing with “our infantry protecting the flanks, and driving the enemy before them until the halt was sounded.”  As Morrell described: “Griffin’s battery moved forward, supported by the 13NY (Marshall), first to a position near Harris’ house and then beyond Peake’s Station to the right of the railroad, and the enemy were driven far into the woods.”  [Griffin, Vol XI, pp. 696-7; Morrell p. 700].  Martindale, however, reported that, presumably in the afternoon encounter, he found Griffin’s battery “farther in the rear.. firing directly across the line of the Forty-fourth New York at a long range exceeding 1,200 year…and fearing a mistake, I rode up in front of it to have the battery thrown forward.”  Griffin, according to Martindale, directed him to Porter, who, at this point, ordered cease fire generally.  [Martindale, XI, p. 706]    Marshall (13NY) wrote that he was positioned with Griffin, and that with Griffin’s battery “we alone followed the enemy from half to three-quarters of a mile, receiving a handsome volley from him. We succeeded in drawing their fire when we opened upon them, which, with the murderous fire from Griffin’s battery, caused them to retire completely routed.” Then they were joined by Cass’s 9MA on Griffin’s right.  “Griffin’s battery behaved with its well-known bravery.”  [Col. Elisha G Marshall, 31NY, Vol. XI, p. 740]. Capt. Augustus P. Martin reported that Battery C Mass Light Artillery engaged with Martindale (Gove’s 22MA), temporarily driven back [XI p. 697].  Capt. George D. Allen of EMA light Art reported joining McQuade, commanding the second brigade, but too late to take part in action near Hanover Court House and followed Griffin’s battery in turn back to rear.  

For a description of the confusing Battle of Hanover Courthouse,  see Jerry Joseph Coggeshall, Hanover Courthouse: The Union’s Tactical Victory and Strategic Failure (1999); https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1015&context=history_etds

Hanover Courthouse:

Porter’s Division casualties: 62 killed, 223 wounded and 70 missing.  Griffin’s command: 1 killed, 7 wounded: MA Light Art Batt C had two men wounded; D5US Art had 3 men wounded; M2US Art (Capt. Henry Benson) had one killed, two wounded –operated under BG Emory as horse artillery.  

On May 28, the battery was ordered by Griffin back down the road in rear of the advance force. Then on May 29, Griffin ordered the battery back to camp at Gaines’ Mill.  No ammunition expended. [XI, p. 698]. 

V Corps and Griffin were not engaged at Seven Pines. 

[Porter’s Division from May 30 through June 25 – See Capt. William B Weeden Batt C 1RI Art– his battery remained in camp on Gaines’ farm from Jun1 to June 26, p. 282]

For further Research: Circumstances of west point artillery officers getting infantry brigades

PROMOTION:

To George B. McClellan [1]

Major General McClellan. Executive Mansion,
Near York-Town, Va. Washington, April 29, 1862.

Would it derange, or embarrass your operations, if I were to appoint Capt. Charles Griffin → , a Brigadier General of volunteers? Please answer. A. LINCOLN

(Send in Cypher)

ANNOTATION

[1]   ALS-P, ISLA; LS, RPB. McClellan replied on April 30, 9 P.M., “It will not at all embarrass or interfere with my arrangements if you appoint Capt Chas ← Griffin → . . . . All goes well.” (DLC-RTL). Captain Charles ← Griffin of the Fifth Artillery was nominated brigadier general of Volunteers on May 1 and confirmed by the Senate on June 9, 1862. Source: Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Volume 5

Richard Auchmuty in a letter to his mother dated June 14, 1862, writes that Griffin had was “just appointed a brigadier.” Auchmuty, June 14, 1862, Letters, p. 60. 

TAKING BRIGADE COMMAND AND BEAVER DAM CREEK (MECHANICSVILLE): AN EVENTFUL JUNE 26, 1862

On June 25, Griffin, now brigadier general of volunteers, reported for duty at V Corps headquarters near New Bridge, VA, and was assigned command of Morell’s second brigade (Morell had been promoted to division commander) in place of Col. McQuade of the 14th New York. Fred. Locke (V Corps AAG) wrote that McQuade had “successfully and satisfactorily and in action gallantly commanded… only in consequence of the ordinary routine of duty which compels to be given a brigadier-general the command appropriate to his rank.”  [OR, VOL LI PART 1, p. 701].  The 2d Brigade, 1st Division, Fifth Corps consisted of: 14NY, 4MI, 62PA and 9MA).  

Griffin took command at 2pm the next day, June 26, “and at 3 o’clock same date received orders for the brigade to move immediately in the direction of headquarters Fifth Provisional Army Corps, when further orders were received to march as speedily as possible to the support of General J. F. Reynolds, who was engaging the enemy at or near Mechanicsville.”  Auchmuty wrote that Griffin “took command two hours before the battle of Mechanicsville.” Auchmuty, June 28, 1862, Letter, p. 66. 

Griffin wrote that his brigade “arrived about 5.30 o’clock, and by direction of General Reynolds formed line of battle, under a terrific artillery fire, in rear of the center of the line engaged. Soon after, the Fourth Michigan, Col. D. A. Woodbury, moved forward and relieved Colonel Simmons’ Pennsylvania regiment, and the Fourteenth New York, Col. James McQuade, advanced to relieve and support the Kane Rifles on the right. The Fourth Michigan was scarcely in position when it was attacked by two regiments of the enemy, which were repulsed in the handsomest manner, the regiment firing about 15 rounds per man. Four companies of the Fourteenth were engaged for a short time. After night-fall the firing ceased and the enemy fell back, whilst our troops held their position until 2 o’clock on the morning of the 27th, when orders were received to return to our former camp, which was reached about 7 o’clock.”  Porter later commended Griffin for “excellent posting of his men.” [XI, Part II, p. 226]

Auchmuty wrote that at 2AM “an order came to fall back to our old camp near Gaines’ Mills (Camp New Bridge)… by daylight we were on our way back, the rebels shelling the road. At Gaines’ Mills we had breakfast, and heard that our camp was to be abandoned for a better position. Most of the supplies had been sent over the Chickahominy during the night; those reaming were burned.” Auchmuty, July 5, 1862, Letters p. 69. 

Griffin reported the following casualties in his new brigade 

Beaver Dam Creek (Mechanicsville): 

14NY: 1 killed and 3 wounded; 

4MI: 3 killed, 22 wounded, and 4 missing; 

9MA: 1 killed and 2 wounded

62PA: none

TOTAL: 5 killed; 27 wounded, 4 missing [OR XI VOL. 2, P. 313]

BATTLE OF GAINES MILL, JUNE 27

The morning of June 27, Porter ordered Morrell to move his division “beyond Gaines Mill, which was begun at daybreak.”  [Morrell p. 272].  Griffin gave a clear account of his brigade during Gaines Mill: “About 9 a. m. of the 27th the brigade received orders to fail back and take position on the east side of Gaines Creek, which point was reached about 10 o’clock.” Morrell wrote that his division “retired about a mile beyond Gaines Mill to Mrs. Watts farm, near New Cold Harbor,” and Griffin’s brigade was posted to the right of the division’s first brigade [Morell p. 272-3].  Griffin continued:  “The urgency of the movement rendered the destruction of our commissary stores and camp and garrison equipage necessary in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy, a number of wagons belonging to the brigade train being at the White House. The Ninth Massachusetts, under command of Colonel Cass, was ordered by General Morell to hold the enemy in check and prevent his crossing at Gaines’ Mill, which duty was gallantly performed. The enemy crossing above the mill in force, Colonel Cass was ordered to fall back gradually to the line occupied by the other regiments of the brigade.” Morrell wrote that Cass was ordered to ‘hold the enemy in check at the bridge at Gaines’ Mill, as long as practicable and then to retire slowly to our positon, which was ably performed.” [Morrell, p. 273]

According to Griffin, at “about 12 m. the enemy appeared in force in front of the Ninth Massachusetts, posted on the right, and made a fierce attack. The Ninth as a regiment received the onslaught with steadiness and repulsed it. The extreme left wavered for a moment, but soon recovered its place. The Fourteenth New York was in line of battle to the left of the Ninth and the Fourth Michigan some distance to the left of the Fourteenth. The right wing of the Fourteenth was exposed to a heavy fire of the enemy at this time, but nobly and repeatedly drove him back at the point of the bayonet. Lieutenant-Colonel Skillen, of the Fourteenth, was here mortally wounded. The Sixty-second Pennsylvania, which had been held in reserve, was moved up to support the Ninth Massachusetts, and after delivering a volley was pushed forward by its gallant colonel at a charge bayonet. Colonel Black was instantly killed at the head of his regiment during the charge. The right wing of the Fourteenth and the Ninth and the Sixty-second held their position in the wood, resisting repeated attacks by fresh troops of the enemy, until they were relieved by Newton’s brigade and ordered to fall back. About 6 o’clock the Sixty-second [62PA], having received a fresh supply of ammunition, was gallantly led by Lieutenant-Colonel Sweitzer to support the troops on our left. In this advance Colonel Sweitzer was badly wounded and left on the field. The left wing of the brigade, consisting of the Fourth Michigan, and the left wing of the Fourteenth New York, under command of Colonel McQuade, held its position until late in the evening, but was forced to retire after the troops on the left of the line gave way.

Griffin: “It may be proper to mention here that the artillery, by order of General Porter and under my direction, opened fire upon the enemy advancing upon our left, but it was too late. Our infantry had already commenced to fall back, and nothing being left to give confidence to the artillerymen, it was impossible to make them stand to their work. The brigade was rallied and formed in its proper order near the hospital, where it remained until 2 o’clock the next morning, when it crossed the Chickahominy and encamped near general headquarters.  Our loss in the battle was as follows: Killed, 96; wounded, 354; missing, 136—an aggregate of 586.”   [Official Records VOL XI, Part II (June 25 – Sept. 2, 1862) No. 127. Report of Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade, of the battles of Mechanicsville and Gaines’ Mill, engagement at Turkey Bridge, and battle of Malvern Hill. Hdqrs. Second Brigade, Morell’s Division, July 5, 1862. p. 312]

Regarding Griffins’ brigade at Gaines Mill, Morrell wrote that “The enemy approached through the woods from the direction of New Cold Harbor, and made their first serious attack about 12’oclock upon the right, which was handsomely repulsed by Griffin’s brigade. The second attack was made about 2:30 and the third about 5:30 o’clock, each extending along my entire front, and both, like the first, were gallantly, repulsed.” The fourth attack on center and left forced his division to retire.  [p. 273]

According to Porter: “About 6 o’clock the enemy renewed the attack, advancing immense bodies of infantry, under cover of artillery, along the road from Cold Harbor to Adams’ house, immediately upon our right and center, where Sykes’ division and Griffin’s brigade were place. This furious attack was successfully resisted and repulsed, but immediately renewed by fresh troops. The reserves were pushed as rapidly as possible into the woods to the support of Griffin, whose regiments were relieved upon the expenditure of their ammunition. This and all our positions were held against enormous odds, and the enemy were at times driven back by our battalions of fresh troops as they were successfully thrown into action.” [No. 93: Reports of BG FJ Porter, US Army, commanding Fifth Corps, HQ V Corps; Camp at Harrison’s Landing July 7, 1862, p. 224.

Gen. George McCall:     “About sunset Griffin’s brigade, with Edwards’ (regular) battery, arrived. The former I requested its gallant leader to move to the extreme right, that being the weakest point in my position. Some time elapsed before these troops could reach their ground, and as the enemy had advanced only a portion of this force could be brought into action. Then, a short time before the close of the engagement, the 4MI, Col Woodbury, relieved the 5PA Res, whose ammunition was exhausted, and two companies of the 14NY joined the Rifles and the detachment of Berdan’s sharpshooters.” Regarding the withdrawal: “Griffin’s brigade and Edwards’ battery were the next to be withdrawn. This was done coolly and successfully.” McCall continued “It is with much gratification that I acknowledge my obligation to General Griffin, who promptly brought his fine brigade to my support at a time it was supposed to be much needed.”  [OR VOL XI, Part II (June 25 – Sept. 2, 1862) No. 154: Rep of BG George A. McCall, USArmy commanding 3rd Div. HQ McCall’s Div; Camp near Harrison’s Landing, August 12, 1862, pp. 386-7]

 At least one contemporaneous account from a reporter writing to a Utica newspaper – the home of the 14NY – questioned the extent to which Griffin commanded the brigade at Gaines Mill, remarking that “The brunt of the engagement was sustained by the 2d Brigade, nominally commanded by Gen. Griffin, although Col McQuade was the moving spirit.” [[Utica] Evening Telegraph, July 9, 1862.  https://museum.dmna.ny.gov/application/files/9415/5059/2043/14thInfCWN05.pdf   However, the author of the regimental history of the 9th Mass. Infantry, did not seem to agree with this assessment, writing about the occasion of Griffin’s promotion to brigade command: “No braver or fighter as an artillerist held rank in the regular army than General Griffin. His promotion to that of brigadier-general was won by honest merit and hard work. During the whole war his brilliant career proved the wisdom of his selection.” The History of the Ninth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, Second Brigade, First Division, Fifth Army Corps  Army of the Potomac  June 1861-June 1864 by Daniel George MacNamara (Boston 1899) https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015019940538 p. 111;

Richard Auchmuty wrote of Gaines Mill: “A day of horrors has passed, such as I pray God I may never undergo again. To see our splendid division [Morrell’s] crushed down, to say nothing of the more selfish fear of death, for six hours, was an awful thing to undergo.” He reported that “At 11;45 they open on our division, drawn up in a single line on the crest of a hill for a mile and a half. They came up three times, with fresh troops in solid masses. Three times we drove them back, being reenforced by McCall and Slocum, until at the fourth attack of over half an hour of shot, shell and musketry, our line gave way, partly rallied, and then rushed pell-mell to a position in front of the lower bridge. We left there during the night…” Auchmuty, June 28, 1862, Letters, pp. 64-5. 

Griffin’s 2d Brigade at Gaines Mill, Casualties:

9MA:    57 killed, 149 wounded, 25 Missing/Captured:  231

14NY:   11 killed; 73 wounded, 15 m/c: 99

 62PA:   15 killed; 73 wound;      76 m/c: 164

4MI      15 killed; 41 wound;      32 m/c  88

TOTAL:  98 killed; 336 wounded; 148 m/c:  582 total.

JUNE 28

Morrell’s division crossed the Chickahominy via Alexander’s Bridge, and bivouacked near the late general headquarters, on Dr. Trent’s farm. Then marched to Savage Station, then crossed White Oak Swamp, bivouacked on the south side on Britton’s farm. [No. 112 Report of BG George W. Morell, US Army, commanding First Division, HQ Morrell’s Div, Fifth Army Corps (Porter’s), Harrison’s Bar, VA July 21,1862]   Griffin: About 2 o’clock p. m. June 28 the brigade left this point and marched to White Oak Swamp, where it encamped for the night, moving the next morning toward Turkey Island Bridge, which was reached about 10 o’clock a. m. June 30.  [Official Records VOL XI, Part II (June 25 – Sept. 2, 1862), No. 127. Report of Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade, of the battles of Mechanicsville and Gaines’ Mill, engagement at Turkey Bridge, and battle of Malvern Hill. Hdqrs. Second Brigade, Morell’s Division, July 5, 1862. [p. 312]

JUNE 29                                    SAVAGE STATION

Signal Officer Major Albert J. Myer, reports Griffin’s artillery in action “During this action other stations were established communicating the position of General Porter, after he came upon the field, to where our advanced batteries (under General Griffin, stationed a mile distant, on the Quaker Road) were firing on the enemy. Some messages in reference to this firing were thence communicated to General Porter. These field stations were withdrawn at dark.” No. 12 Albert J. Myer, Signal Officer Major USA CSO Army Potomac to the Adjutant General “The Battle of Savage Station” (beg. p. 254), p. 258:Official Records Vol. XI, Part I    Official Records Vol. XI, Part I

Porter sends Morrell’s division to the junction of Long Bridge/New Market road and Charles City and Quaker Roads, forming line facing Richmond.  No. 112 Report of BG George W. Morell, US Army, commanding First Division. HQ Morrell’s Div, Fifth Army Corps (Porter’s), Harrison’s Bar, VA July 21,1862]

Auchmuty: “At one o’clock we were told to move to Savage Station, about three miles, but marched eight miles to White Oak Swamp. There we had a beautiful camp and a good night’s rest. Auchmuty, July 5, 1862, Letters, p. 70. 

JUNE 30                        GLENDALE/FRAYSER’S FARM – WHITE OAK SWAMP

Morrell: Monday (June 30) the division started for Turkey Bridge and James River via Quaker Rd and Malvern Hill. The division occupied the extreme left of the line at Battle of Malvern Hill. The Second Brigade, General Griffin, was ordered to the front. The artillery advanced toward the woods, and was supported on the left by the 9MA (Cass) and 62PA (Hull) and on right by part of Couch’s DIv.  [No. 112 Report of BG George W. Morell, US Army, commanding First Division, HQ Morrell’s Div, Fifth Army Corps (Porter’s), Harrison’s Bar, VA July 21,1862]

Griffin: The men bivouacked in a wood for a [p. 314] few hours, when the brigade was ordered to take position on Malvern Hill, a battle being in progress on our front and left. The Ninth and Sixty-second were moved to the front to support batteries in the wheat field, the Fourteenth and the Fourth being held in reserve. A rebel battery on our left opened fire and killed a sergeant in the Fourth Michigan and slightly wounded one man in the Fourteenth New York. The regiments lay upon their arms and retained their relative positions during the night. Official Records VOL XI, Part II (June 25 – Sept. 2, 1862). No. 127. Report of Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade, of the battles of Mechanicsville and Gaines’ Mill, engagement at Turkey Bridge, and battle of Malvern Hill. Hdqrs. Second Brigade, Morell’s Division, July 5, 1862. [p. 312]

            Butterfield:  Monday June 30 afternoon, received orders to move to a position on Malvern Hill “in front of the Malvern house, supporting some batteries of General Sykes’ division of General Griffin’s brigade, as circumstances might render expedient. …General Griffin sent to me for a regiment to support him late in the afternoon, and the 83PA was sent to him and remained with him overnight, returning next morning.  No. 128: Reports of BG Dan Butterfield, US Army, commanding 3rd Brigade, HQ 3rd Brigade, First Div, V Corps, Camp Harrison’s Landing VA July 11,1862]

JULY 1 MALVERN HILL 

Griffin’s report:

Shortly after sunrise on the morning of July 1 the Fourth Michigan was moved up to relieve the Eighty-third Pennsylvania in supporting our batteries in position on the left. The Fourteenth New York was posted on the hill commanding the Richmond road to protect the left flank, the Ninth Massachusetts and Sixty-second retaining their original positions.

About 8 o’clock General Porter placed the artillery under my command. It was supported on the right by Couch’s division. Not far from 10 o’clock the enemy advanced two brigades in front of Couch’s right, approaching so close as to throw their musket balls into our batteries, but by a quick concentration of the fire of the four batteries on the field they were soon repulsed. About two hours afterward the enemy attempted an advance upon our extreme left with what appeared to be two brigades, forming in the open field, but the same artillery fire caused him to break and retreat in the greatest disorder. An hour, perhaps, after this the enemy attempted the same maneuver near our right and along the road by which the troops came up, but was again handsomely repulsed, by our artillery fire, leaving a stand of colors on the field, which fell into our hands. Here Couch’s right wing advanced and drove the enemy far through the wood. The batteries engaged were Captains Edwards’ and Livingston’s Third U. S. Artillery, four Parrott guns each; Battery D, Fifth U. S. Artillery, under command of Lieutenant Kingsbury, six Parrott guns; Battery A, Fifth U. S. Artillery, Lieutenant Ames, six light 12-pounders, and three guns of Weeden’s Rhode Island and two of Fifth Massachusetts, under command of Lieutenants Waterman and Hyde. The batteries were excellently served. The greatest coolness and bravery were displayed by officers and men, and my only regret is my inability to mention the officers by name.

After this a sharp fire was kept up by skirmishers and artillery until 5.30 o’clock, when the enemy made his final and fiercest attack on our left. The artillery continued its effective fire until the enemy arrived within a few yards of our batteries, when the supporting regiments— Fourth Michigan, Colonel Woodbury; Ninth Massachusetts, Colonel Cass, and Sixty-second Pennsylvania, Captain Hull—gallantly moved forward and repulsed him. But a fresh force ma king its appearance both on left and right, the regiments were compelled to fall back, being relieved by the Twelfth New York, Forty-fourth New York, and Eighty-third Pennsylvania. [Butterfield:  ordered 44NY “to advance in line of battle, cross the field in front, and relieve a portion of General Griffin’s command, who ammunition seemed to be exhausted, and to charge the enemy with the 83rd regiment.” No. 128: Reports of BG Dan Butterfield, US Army, commanding 3rd Brigade, p. 320 ]

 Five times were the colors of the Sixty-second-cut down and as often determinedly raised and rescued, the last time being picked up by an officer of the Forty-fourth New York, who delivered them to Captain Hull upon the demand of a sergeant of Company 1) of his regiment. The Sixty-second Pennsylvania left the field with its colors flying. The handsome manner in which the Fourth Michigan stood its ground and the good order in which it retired from the field was the subject of comment among all who witnessed it. The gallant Colonel Woodbury fell dead urging his men on to victory. The Ninth Massachusetts well maintained the reputation it has ever borne, the colonel being dangerously wounded. The Fourteenth New York was [p. 315] moved from its first position to resist an attack of the enemy, who was endeavoring to turn our left flank, and exposed to a most deadly fire, which it withstood without flinching during the entire engagement, repulsing the enemy three times. The Fourteenth was not relieved, but held its position on the field of battle until 2 o’clock the next morning, when the entire army was ordered to fall back.

The casualties were as follows: Killed, 79; wounded, 414; missing, 38; an aggregate of 531. During the cannonade of the enemy on the 3d of July 2 men of the Fourteenth New York were wounded. An accurate report of the killed, wounded, and missing will be found in the accompanying statements of regiments. No language could do justice to the admirable conduct of the officers and men. The evidence of their courage will be found in the list of killed and wounded, and the comparatively small number of missing, a majority of whom it is but fair to suppose were left on the field disabled. The men received but one day’s rations from the 27th of June to the 2d of July, yet they made no complaints, but endured the hardships of the march patiently, and fought in every engagement with the courage and impetuosity of fresh troops.

This report would not be complete if it omitted a proper recognition of the valuable services of my acting assistant adjutant-general, Lieut. 0. B. Mervine, and Lieut. W. G. Lowry, aide-de-camp. Their bravery in action, alacrity in the transmission of orders, and unfaltering endurance of the fatiguing march are worthy of the greatest praise.   [Official Records VOL XI, Part II (June 25 – Sept. 2, 1862) No. 127. Report of Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade, of the battles of Mechanicsville and Gaines’ Mill, engagement at Turkey Bridge, and battle of Malvern Hill. Hdqrs. Second Brigade, Morell’s Division, July 5, 1862. [p. 312]

Martindale: Martindale in person led 13NY to support CG’s 14NY to counter movement “uncover of a bank and turn our left flank.”; Martindale describes night forced march. 

Artillery under Griffin’s command or direction at Malvern Hill: 

Weeden: C1RIBatt in reserve until Griffin commanded them at 12:30pm to take position left of the White House to command the bottom on our left; firing rounds into woods below; at 4pm moved to right of the road, in connection with Allen’s MA Batt they relieved Kingsbury’s Batt, and commenced firing with shrapnel, “and swept the woods wherever the enemy were known to us”; replied to enemy artillery; when enemy deployed “masses of infantry” Batt maintained a rapid fire until the ammunition was expended, excepting canister which could not be safely used “owing to the oblique front of General Couch’s troops on the right”; relieved by batt of 10 pounders and retired at 7pm along with Phillips MA Batt) No. 115 Rep of Capt. William B Weeden, Battery C, 1RI Light Artillery, Chief of Artillery, or operations May 24-July 2. [HQ BattC 1RILA, Harrison’s Bar July 2, 1862]

Capt. Bramhall, 6NY Batt: “Our fire now grew very slow and deliberate, being maintained by order of and in the manner prescribed by Brigadier- General Griffin, in command at that point.” No. 34 Report of Capt. Walter M. Bramhall, Sixth NY Battery, July 5, 1862- Battle of Malvern Hill,On July 1, about 7AM – Official Records VOL XI, Part II (June 25 – Sept. 2, 1862), p. 105.

TW Osborn,  Batt D, 1NY Light Art:  “At 7AM, the enemy appeared in large force on the main road on our front, coming forward rapidly, driving our pickets in, and yelling desperately. General Griffin ordered Lieutenant Winslow to open fire upon them, which he did, firing at 3 [degree} elevation 5 inch fuse, and having a most admirable cross-fire on the enemy with Captain Bramhall’s battery. Lieutenant Winslow and Captain Bramhall fired rapidly and their ammunition worked well. There were two other batteries in position, but were not firing so rapidly. The enemy retreated under the artillery fire in a very few minutes, our infantry not becoming engaged.” No. 38 Report of TW Osborn, Battery D, 1st NY Light Artillery, July 4, 1862 of engagement at Oak Grove or King’s School-House, battle of Savage Station, engagement at Malvern Cliff, and battle of Malvern Hill, OR VOL XI, Part II, p. 119

Edwards, Batt L&M 3US Art. – I was ordered to the front July 1 “General Griffin directed me to a position near a small house, about 900 yards from the woods in front, where the enemy had their forces concealed….. After some time a regiment of rebels emerged from the woods waving their flag. The battery plied them with case-shot, and as they approached nearer with double rounds of canister. The 9MA, which was in rear of my battery, then rose up, gave a cheer, and advanced bravely as far as the rear of my limbers, where they crouched down and opened a fire of musketry in spite of all my efforts to stop them, thereby placing my men and horses in great jeopardy.” 9MA advanced a short distance beyond the guns, which then limbered up and withdrew.  No. 139 Rep. of Capt. John Edwards, Commanding Batteries L and M, 3US Art. P. 357]

Official Records Vol. XI, Part I. No. 112 Report of BG George W. Morell, US Army, commanding First Division HQ Morrell’s Div, Fifth Army Corps (Porter’s), Harrison’s Bar, VA July 21,1862]

Tues (July 1) early morning 4MI (Woodbury) relieved 83PA sent forward to left of batteries. 14NY (McQuade) with a section of Weeden’s Battery, “placed in the edge of the field, between the Richmond road and Dr. JH Mellert’s house, facing to the west, to watch the road and valley and protect our left. …. The artillery in front was placed under command of General Griffin.” Griffin’s brigade directly in front of Martindale and Butterfield.

p. 276: late afternoon, enemy appeared ascending the hill near Mellert’s house, and opened fire on 14NY, which promptly advanced to meet them, and after a sharp engagement, in which three attacks were repulsed, drove them away.”

On Left front: enemy in great force emergerd from the woods and nontwithtanding the severe fire from the batteries, advanced steadily until they arrived near them, when the supporting regiments – 4MI (Woodbury) 9MA (Cass) and 62PA (Hull) “gallantly moved forward and repulsed them” but regiments compelled to fall back to “their former position, where they maintained their ground until their ammunition was exhausted, and they were regularly relieved”

Enemy “fought with great obstinacy, but made no impression on our line… they were finally driven from the field, which remained in our possession, and was picketed from my division by the First Brigade, 16MI of the 3rd and “14NY of the second brigade, this last regiment retaining the position it held in the morning. The Second Brigade, with the exception of 14NY, when relieved retired to the vicinity of Malvern House.”

Arrived at Harrison’s Bar near sunrise Wed. July 2.

At Malvern, 4MI “nobly held its ground after its colonel (Woodbury) was killed until its ammunition [p. 277] was exhausted and it was relieved by 14NY, when it retired in perfect order.” Also at Malvern, Col Cass mortally wounded, dying a few days after reaching home.

“I desire especially to recognize the services of General Griffin, who held the front at Malvern, and in addition to his brigade had the immediate command of the batteries, which his knowledge and experience as an officer of artillery enabled him to use with a skill and judgment that contributed materially to our success. His horse was killed under him.” Recommends, McQuade 14NY, only surviving colonel in 2nd Brigade, for promotion.

22MA

Parker, Henry Wilson’s Regiment:  P. 128  July 1, 1862  “Gen. Griffin , who was near where the Twenty-second was posted, watching the progress of the battle, when he saw his old battery, the Fifth United States, threatened by the advance of a rebel line, rode up with his hat in his hand, and shouted, “Gen. Martindale, forward your brigade! They are charging my battery. ”Previous to this, we had deployed column and fixed bayonets, and were all ready to move at the word . “Attention ! Charge bayonets! Forward!” and we were off as if it were a battalion-drill. Gen. Martindale was delighted, and exclaimed, “Beautiful, beautiful, Twenty-second!” We advanced until almost on a line with the battery , and then lay down . While in this position , Capt. Wardwell went along the line and set the men to singing “ John Brown’s Body.” Finally , the regiment was ordered to support the first line of battle , which was being hard pressed . The regiment opened fire by file, and fired sixty rounds of ammunition, and held their position until relieved . They captured thirty-two prisoners, and sent them to the rear.”

9MA:  

I.  “The Fighting Ninth” for Fifty Years and the Semi-Centennial Celebration by Frank L Flynn

Malvern Hill  p. 21: “Gen. Griffin was one of the most conspicuous officers on that day.  He was a thorough artillerist and he rode from one end of the battlefield to the other placing the batteries in the best positions.”

p. 22  “Gen. Griffin, who had spent the day with the artillery now had returned to his brigade and shouted for the men to be ready to charge. Going by the front of the Ninth he shouted: ‘Out Col. Cass, get ready to charge; they are coming.’”

II. The History of the Ninth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, Second Brigade, First Division, Fifth Army Corps  Army of the Potomac  June 1861-June 1864 by Daniel George MacNamara (Boston 1899) https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015019940538

p. 111; “No braver or fighter as an artillerist held rank in the regular army than General Griffin. His promotion to that of brigadier-general was won by honest merit and hard work. During the whole war his brilliant career proved the wisdom of his selection.” 

p. 151 Malvern Hill “This particular artillery was under the direction of Gen. Charles Griffin, commanding the 2d brigade.  He was a West Point artillery officer of great skill, bravery and experience. His great activity in placing batteries in position, and his general supervision of the artillery battle-line that day was most conspicuous from the fact that, at time during the early part of the day, he was the only mounted officer to be seen on the field directing operations. He was an officer greatly beloved by all the soldiers that he ever commanded.”

p. 152  During the forenoon General Griffin was activity itself as he rode in all and every direction over the field occupied by his artillery. As fast as our batteries came galloping up from the right and rear he would ride up swiftly at their head and lead them into good positions. In every instance he personally directed each new arrival while shot and shell flew over the field ; a matter of fact that he treated with cool indifference. The troops of the division, while quietly watching his movements, commented freely on “Black Jack’s ” (a nickname for General Griffin on account of his swarthy complexion) chances of getting hit, momentarily fearing that the danger he courted would surely end in wounding or killing him; but he bore a charmed life it seemed. When asked why he didn’t dismount, he said it would not do for him, for his legs shook so that he couldn’t stand. No braver man than General Griffin was in the army; notwithstanding his weak legs.”

“At about noontime, during some lively cannonading, General Griffin dashed up to the headquarters of General Martindale, near the cut road, on the bank under the friendly shade and protection of a large tree, and reining up his active bay horse, called out in his charac- teristic shrill tones, that were plainly heard by the writer: “Martin- [153] dale, come out here, and I will show you the best artillery fighting that you ever saw.” Receiving only a negative shake of the head from General Martindale in reply (who was at the time in command of his brigade nearby), General Griffin dashed away to place another newly arrived battery in position where it would do the most good for the Union army. While hastening towards this particular battery his orderly’s horse was struck with a piece of an exploding shell on the ear and across the back near the saddle. The orderly quickly dismounted and removed the harness from his disabled animal and then went to the rear for another mount. The poor horse, finding himself free, wandered away bleeding from his wounds and shaking his head to free his ear from the blood that trickled into it. In the meantime General Griffin had gone down the line at a rapid canter, wholly oblivious of the fact that his brave orderly had suddenly disappeared.”

p. 155  “General Griffin rode up to his brigade, on his spirited bay horse, and, in his clear shrill tones, called on his regimental commanders to “get ready to charge.” He likewise warned each brigade commander to be ready. Again, in a short time, he dashed on to the line of the Ninth and cried out “Colonel Cass’ Get ready to charge They are coming !” 

Major Hanley, who was now acting lieutenant-colonel in command of the right wing of the regiment, saw General Griffin coming, and was on his feet in an instant ready to assume command, thinking, perhaps, that Colonel Cass would be unable to go forward in the charge.  Lieutenant-Colonel Guiney, who had been prostrated since the close of the battle of the 27th ult., had previously been taken violently sick on the field, and had to be assisted to an ambulance. From lack of proper food, medicine and rest, he was so weak as to finally be unable to move without assistance. The surgeon pronounced him sick with malarial fever and ordered him home. Colonel Cass ordered Captain O’Leary of Company F in charge of the left wing of the regi-ment, as acting major. At the same time he placed Sergt.-Maj. P. E. Murphy in command of Captain O’Leary’s company, as there was no lieutenant with the company, one being absent wounded, and the other a prisoner in the hands of the enemy since the battle of Gaines’ Mill. Colonel Cass on hearing General Griffin’s orders, which the latter supplemented by shouting, “Up Ninth and at them : ” cried out at once, “Attention, battalion ” whereupon every man of the Ninth sprang from the ground like magic, eager for the fray.”

Official Records VOL XI, Part II (June 25 – Sept. 2, 1862)

p. 30 Casualties AOP operations before Richmond June 25 – July 2 inclusive:

V Corps, 2nd Brigade – Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin: [officers/enlisted men]

9MA: Killed 8/61; Wound: 10/271; Missing/Capt 2/41 = 393

4MI: killed 5/51; Wound: 5/136; M/C: 1/54 = 252

14NY: Killed 3/30; Wound: 9/167; M/C 1/15 = 225

62 PA: killed 2/22; wound 10/164; M/C 4/81 = 283

Total: killed 18/164; wound 34/738; M/C 8/191 = 1,153

In his debut at brigade command level, Griffin made a very positive on at least one private.  Charles W. Phelps (4MI) wrote the following to his brother dated just two days after Malvern Hill:  “I see General (Charles) Griffin gets considerable praise during the last battle (that) we had. He is the best  in the country around here , besides (being) a good infantry commander. He was put in command of our brigade just before we left Gaines Mills on this last retreat.  He don’t fear the devil. He would ride along side the lines between us and the rebels and find out just how they were.”  Charles W Phelps to Dear Brother [Jay E. Phelps], July 3, 1862  Source:  https://4thmichigan.wordpress.com/charles-w-phelps/


 

The 4th Michigan speaks about Griffin

  Excerpts from  Crawford, K., & Bertera, M.N. (2010).  The 4th Michigan Infantry in the Civil War.  (first cloth ed.). East Lansing: Mi...